ICAC Early Classic Cases - 26 Public Housing Blocks Case

Born Out of a Fire

On Christmas day 1953, a fire broke out at the Shek Kip Mei Squatter Area and left more than 50,000 people homeless. The blaze obliged the government to draw up a policy on public housing and a large number of low-cost housing estates were built to resettle the displaced squatters.

However, well-intentioned as it was, no-one realised this massive housing project would sow the seeds of a scandal in subsequent years.

Structural Problems Surface

On January 9, 1982, the ICAC received information that there were structural defects at some blocks of the Kwai Fong Estate blocks, an 11-block project built in 1971. The most serious problem was found at Block 6 where Housing Department inquiry revealed that the concrete was under strength. This was caused, it said, by insufficient cement being mixed into the concrete.

Subsequently, the Housing Department carried out in 1983 and 1984 a thorough structural inspection of all public housing blocks of five-years-old or more with special attention on concrete quality and strength.

(Caption : Legislators inspected an affected unit in late 1985 to see for themselves the gravity of the problem.)

(Caption: Residents outpoured their grief to Legco member Lee Peng-fei during his visit to the problem blocks in 1985.)

The Demolition Bombshell

In November 1985, the Housing Department announced that the strength of the concrete in Blocks 8, 9, 10 and 11 of Kwai Fong Estate and at 22 other public housing blocks - all built between 1964 and 1973 - were below standard. Those blocks would have to be demolished as they posed a danger to residents. The announcement triggered heavy criticism from the public and a number of legislators.

Residents associations and pressure groups petitioned Legislative Council members to voice their grievances and some suggested that corruption might be involved. The Legco responded by setting up various working groups to probe into the structural safety of the 26 blocks and the legal aspects of the issue.

Some Legco members urged the authorities to conduct an in-depth investigation into the “scandal” to find out whether corruption was indeed involved and to take legal or disciplinary action against culpable officials and construction contractors.

The Problem Blocks

The 26 problem blocks to be pulled down were all of Type I and Type II resettlement housing estates which were built to “meet emergency needs”. Facilities provided in these estates, all were six-to-seven storeys, were basic and simple. Of these 26 blocks, nine were in the New Territories, 15 in Kowloon and two on the Hong Kong Island.

1

Lam Tin Estate

Blocks 12, 13 and 17

2

Sau Mau Ping Estate

Block 26

3

Tsz Man Estate

Blocks 61 - 65

4

Tsz Oi Estate

Block 40

5

Pat Tin Estate

Blocks 14 - 16

6

Shek Lei Estate

Blocks 4 and 6

7

Kwai Hing Estate

Blocks 3 - 5

8

Kwai Fong Estate

Block 8 - 11

9

Kwai Shing East Estate

Blocks 18 and 20

10

Wong Chuk Hang Estate

Block 9

11

Shek Pai Wan Estate

Block 2

During site visits, every demolition workers that ICAC investigators had spoken with unanimously described as an “effortless” job to dismantle the problem blocks. The investigators were shown just how fragile the flooring was as one worker knocked open a gaping hole in the middle of the floor simply by punching it with an iron rod.

Public housing blocks built in the sixties and seventies were required to have a concrete strength of at least 3,000 pounds per square inch - or should not fall below 20.7 MPa (megapascal) in today’s measurements. The lower the floor, the greater should be the concrete strength. However, of all the 570 public housing blocks inspected by the Housing Department by the end of 1985, the average concrete strength was below 15 MPa while one block registered a strength level as low as 5.9 MPa.

The frequency of concrete strength testing is determined by the quantity of concrete used for a structure. A pre-cast mould is filled with concrete and, upon curing, soaked in water for 28 days before delivering to a laboratory for the “crushing” test. The compressive force needed to break the concrete represents the strength of the concrete.

In order to ensure that the concrete strength is up to the standard, it is important that all the sampling, delivering, testing and recording procedures conform to a prescribed system.

A construction company with slightly more than HK$200,000 in operating capital was awarded a government project of over 3.6 million in 1969! In the sixties this modest company was listed last in the government’s register of contractors. Believe it or not, it climbed to the top of the list in six years. This company was one of the contractors connected to the 26 problem blocks.

Another construction firm that ran on miniscule capital and had only a few staff at that time, also won a government contract for a HK$500,000 project. This company was given an additional eleven contracts at the peak of the public housing construction. And its staff size expanded to more than 20 in no time.

Call for Action

The Housing Department’s announcement to demolish the 26 problem blocks triggered strong protests from affected residents and aroused concerns of members of the then Legco. In a Legco meeting held on December 18, 1985, some Legco members urged for a thorough investigation into the ‘26 Blocks Scandal’ to ascertain whether corruption was at play. The Legco members also demanded legal or disciplinary actions against responsible government officials and contractors found to be responsible.

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