Chapter 4
No Stone Unturned
Undesirable association
Preliminary investigation revealed that D1 and D2 had lunch together almost every day. Their travel records clearly showed their frequent trips to the mainland on the same dates, which were believed to be for fun and entertainment. All these took place only after D1 was posted to Kwun Tong District as Chief Technical Officer in 2012. It led to speculation that they did not know each other beforehand and it was due to work relationship that put them together.
Excursions up north
In order to gather more evidence, the ICAC started monitoring the duo.
Investigations disclosed that D1 and D2 went to the mainland about every two weeks. On most occasions, D2 arranged for a ride by his company's vehicle to take the duo to the MTR Sheung Shui Station of the East Rail Line, heading north to the mainland. They would deliberately chose to return to Hong Kong at different time of the day.
Tens of thousands of cash deposits were made into D1's account one or two days after each of their mainland trips. Obviously, it was no longer mere fun and entertainment. The ICAC investigating officers therefore kept dogging them, especially D1's whereabouts upon his return to Hong Kong.
Investigating officers revealed that D1 usually went to different money changers at lunch time for money exchange on the following day after his return to Hong Kong, and then deposited the money in cash at banks or through automatic teller machines.
"They were extremely cautious. That's why they arranged to offer and collect the bribes in cash outside Hong Kong, making it very difficult for us to detect their transactions. What's even more difficult was that they returned to Hong Kong in very late hours each time," an investigating officer recalled. "Their transactions did not go through any third party at all, which was probably intended to keep those in the know to the minimum."
Collecting evidence
In order not to risk oneself in a vulnerable position to compromise, public officers will usually avoid dealings with service contractors in their private capacity. However, D1 and D2 were found to have frequent lunch together. Same as the arrangements for their mainland trips, D1 was taken by D2's subordinates in his company car to luxury Chinese restaurants near the latter's workplaces in Kowloon Bay and Kwun Tong for lunch. D2's two subordinates, however, could only have meals at less classy eateries nearby.
Such lavish luncheons had lasted for few months. During these occasions, 95% of the bills were paid by D2. It went way beyond ordinary treats between ordinary friends. Investigating officers firmly believed that something fishy should have been going on.
Surveillance officers are often required to monitor the targets around the clock to gather evidence. "We have to blend in with the surrounding and the community when performing the physical surveillance duty. Shorts and flip-flops were put on sometimes to disguise as none but just someone from the neighbourhood!"
Round-the-clock surveillance demands very long working hours. The personal lives of officers, who work day and night to perform such duty, are immensely affected. On a daily basis, officers can only afford several hours of rest at home and are off to work again. Time is crucial as evidence never waits!
Monitoring work may become repetitive and the surroundings may be unpleasant sometimes. "It is really tiring as the work must go on, come rain or shine. But it is the evidence that all matters!"
For this case, it took about one year to conduct physical surveillance and monitoring work for gathering evidence. "Round-the-clock surveillance required substantial manpower and resources. So long as there is a suspicion of corruption, we will pursue relentlessly no matter what. Though in some cases it may eventually end up with nothing." During the whole process, frontline investigating officers reported regularly to their supervisors and discuss with them the tactics to gain breakthrough. With support of the supervisors and the unremitting perseverance of our colleagues, we could finally find the evidence for submission to court.
Conclusive evidence?
It was nearly impossible to lay charges against them simply based on the fact that D1 frequently went to the mainland with D2 for entertainment and cash was deposited into D1's account upon his return to Hong Kong.
Moreover, the Highways Department had already approved Contractor S’ appointment of Company C and Company D as suppliers of labour and materials for the road works of Kwun Tong and Wong Tai Sin Districts. It might have nothing to do with the award of contract, even there were bribery acts existed between D1 and D2. The investigating officers could neither build up a relation of the bribes to any single project. No substantial evidence could be found to show that D1 deliberately disclosed internal information to D2 enabling the latter to inflate the contract sum.
On the face of it, D2 seemed to have gained nothing from D1. But D2 kept treating D1 to meals and entertainment? Why? It therefore led to the speculation that he wanted to offer D1 "a general sweetener" so as to keep him sweet.
"Sometimes, the offer of advantage is not directly related to the performance of one specific act. Take this case as an example, the bribes offered by D2 were an inducement to or a reward for D1, in his capacity as a public servant, "to be or to remain favourably disposed to" D2, something commonly known as "general sweetener." The investigating officer went on to explain, "For D2, the "sweetener" offered to D1 each month was just "regular expenses" as well as part of the project costs. It was what so called "playing the long game". A little bit of sweetener that he offered today might be rewarded with favourable treatment or insider information in future. So, this could be regarded as a long term investment."
How much bribe money did D1 receive from D2 in total?
"It is somewhat difficult to answer. The HK$50,000 we seized was hard evidence. Other than that, it was hard to tell the exact amount of the bribes."
Although the ICAC gets hold of information of the two defendants’ bank accounts, there was still no easy way to track down the exact amount of the bribes.
"We were unable to establish the fact that the cash which the Chief Technical Officer (D1) deposited into his account must come from the Subcontractor (D2). Nor could we dig out the truth by probing into the funds movement of Company C and Company D because the money paid to D1 was only of a small amount when compared with other expenses of the companies which held multiple accounts, and the transactions to D1 could also be accounted for under different pretexts. So, despite the professional support from the forensic accountants, it remained to be inconclusive whether certain transactions had anything to do with the bribes."
Global transfer of assets free from any geographical boundaries is made possible by the integration of international financial markets and increasing mobility of capital flow anytime, anywhere across the world. Criminals also made use of such technological advancement to their advantage. The modus operandi of criminal activities become increasingly complex and ever-changing, allowing the corrupt to transfer illicit gains through more indirect and intricate methods. This in turn poses huge challenges to the ICAC in tracking the flow of bribes and corrupt transactions.
To enhance our investigation capability over evidence-gathering, the Operations Department has established a Computer Forensics Section to support frontline investigating officers with its computer forensic skills in preserving, seizing, examining and analysing electronic data for the purpose of presenting them as admissible evidence in court.
Established in 2011, the Forensic Accounting (FA) Group comprising Forensic Accountant Grade officers with professional qualifications and extensive forensic accounting experience is responsible for providing effective technical aid from a financial perspective to frontline officers in dealing with cases involving increasingly sophisticated modus operandi. Its scope of services includes providing expert opinions in financial and accounting matters and rendering assistance in search operations. Training sessions are also provided by the Group to frontline officers to enhance their skills and knowledge in financial investigation.